Data collection has become so normalised it is rarely questioned. Big data has been a buzz word for well over a decade, it has been a decade since Edward Snowden revealed the extent of what is essentially the US government’s domestic and international spying via the NSA and various programs, and data has been described by many in the business and tech worlds as the new oil. State and corporate entities have immense power and influence over the modern internet, and dystopian levels of access to personal data. Questions of privacy over security, or privacy over convenience, seem somewhat irrelevant when faced with the question of whether privacy is even possible.
Approaching the issue of privacy from an anarchic lens, there are two main premises that form the foundation. The first is the right to privacy – remaining private and anonymous if desired in online spaces and free from digital surveillance through cameras or microphones – is paramount. Second, data ought to be owned by those who produce it – particularly in cases of personal data like medical records, but also other kinds such as location, content like posts and images, and communications – rather than treating it as a mere commodity. While these do not necessarily sound like radical demands, in an increasingly digitised and connected world, the institutions of state and capital have effectively burrowed into every aspect of our lives.
Starting with the state, one of the greatest threats to individual and communal privacy is the myth of national security. There is little in the way of evidence that mass surveillance by various state agencies, most notably the NSA, actually prevents terror attacks, and in some cases the “successes” touted were set ups by the FBI that manipulated people (particularly Muslims) into trying to carry out acts they otherwise would not have (Bergen et al., 2014; McLaughlin, 2015; Kundnani, 2015). A more accurate definition of national security in this context comes from Chomsky (2015: 122): “security of government officials from the prying eyes of the public to whom they are answerable.”
With the exception of major leaks, such as those through WikiLeaks (such as those carried out by Chelsea Manning or the Vault 7 revelations) or Snowden’s NSA leak, the state remains an incredibly secretive entity. The Vault 7 leaks were particularly damning, revealing the CIA had a massive arsenal of hacking tools, including a “hoard” of zero-day exploits, that could access and utilise various devices and operating systems (WikiLeaks, 2017). Privacy in one’s home seems distant when your phone or smart TV is listening and sending that information back to security agencies around the globe, even if the private company in question hasn’t already allowed them access to devices or data.
While there are some commendable efforts towards returning privacy to our ostensible liberal democracies, such as those discussed by Sacha Molitorisz (2020) to provide a relational approach to privacy and implement regional and global regulatory frameworks to achieve that, it does involve the willingness of states to play along. For a large step back from national security, following the collapse of Roe v. Wade in the US – which, it must be noted, was largely premised on the notion of medical privacy – there were some credible concerns over the use of location data and data from period tracking apps against people being prosecuted for abortion related “crimes” (Torchinsky, 2022). This data accumulated by private companies could be collected – either through mass surveillance or legal processes – by governments and the judiciary in what would be both an intrusion on peoples’ right to medical privacy and their rights to bodily autonomy.
Even technical means of avoiding mass surveillance, such as TOR, are being targeted by the state. Part of Snowden’s leak in 2013 revealed a rather telling perception of such attempts at anonymity by the NSA – TOR was “a tool for terrorists and other criminals”. As Macrina (2015) says, this framing “ignores the many legitimate reasons non-criminals might want to conceal their sensitive personal data from spies and hackers.” For instance, both her and Gelber cite the stifling of free speech and expression through a “chilling effect” and self-censorship, with individuals and communities changing their behaviours and writing as a result of knowing they’re being watched (Macrina, 2015; Gelber, 2016). Contemporary security agencies appear to have become very real and modern versions of mythical deities, whose supernatural surveillance of people’s lives effects the behaviours and sociability of the religious (Norenzayan, 2013). The main difference, other than being real, is that modern surveillance effects everyone, and the consequences are dystopian.
Beyond the state, the other side of the data collection coin is the web of capital, falling under what Zuboff (2019) calls surveillance capitalism. This is worth exploring for two reasons, the first of which is that there is much data the state can collect – “legally” or otherwise – from these private corporations. The second is that these private entities also carry out mass surveillance, and for the most part people willingly give up their data and privacy for access and convenience. In the digital realm, many companies and websites will claim that the data they collect (and then sell) is all anonymised so that it cannot be connected back to a specific person. This is misleading, however, as since the 1990s researchers and journalists have been able to use rather limited amounts of anonymised data to correctly “re-identify” people, using personal or even medical data to do so (Porter, 2008). Given companies like Facebook can create “shadow profiles” of people without accounts based on data provided by users or other sources, the idea private companies (or the state) cannot or do not do “re-identification” comes across rather laughable.
Perhaps even more alarming is the encroachment on the privacy of the household. Personal computers and smart phones aside, the explosion of devices and ordinary household products being connected to the “internet of things” (IOT) has bypassed the physical walls of homes. Smart homes run by “intelligent personal assistants” (IPAs), such as those sold by Google or Amazon, are always watching and listening, “commodifying familial and social spaces and [funnelling] data into corporate networks.” (Pridmore et al., 2019). In 2022, Amazon bought a company called iRobot that sells robotic vacuums and mops with the ability to map floor plans, observe and understand the habits of inhabitants, and navigate and see objects around the home with forward and upwards facing cameras (Tuohy, 2022).
The commodification of data, from simple browser searches to a detailed map of your own home, along with the implications of state capture of this data, has become a defining feature of technological “progress”. In the name of security and profits, privacy has been left to the wayside by governments and the private sector. Even the new “Web3” world of cryptocurrencies and blockchain (and more recently AI), started with Bitcoin and heralded as a return to the more liberatory era of the early internet, has been heavily adopted by business (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). The Brave browser offers privacy and the ability to sell your data, compensation for the advertisements you get, but the trap here is those who can afford privacy will get it, while those of a lower socioeconomic standing could be pressured to give it up for whatever amount is offered.
Genuine data ownership, and privacy as result of that, cannot be provided under the current regimes of state and capital. A truly liberatory digital commons has its proponents, but against the monopoly of the state and private sectors over the digital landscape this public utopia seems quite distant (Scully, 2020; O’Shea, 2019). National security and commodification are not justifiable costs for the public’s loss of control over its data, both as individuals and within communities, and the inherent coercion and violence of the state makes this exceedingly dangerous for those who find themselves in their crosshairs. Even in liberal states, freedom against threats can only go so far before freedom from securitisation becomes necessary for the protection of democracy.
From the anarchist viewpoint, this is a monstrous concession of power and self-determination to state and corporate interests. Molitorisz’s (2020) relational approach, while caught up within a liberal framework, is a compelling one. An individual’s privacy is not just a benefit to them but to society as a whole because these issues of privacy are heavily networked and interconnected. It is not just our own privacy we need to be vigilant of, but ensuring everyone has access to those tools and rights. The effects of our data driven world are hardly understood as it is, having so quickly evolved and only growing, and the capabilities are only getting more expansive and invasive. We need to be careful not to lose the human along the way.
References
Bergen, P., Cahall, B., Schneider, E., & Sterman, D. (2014, January 13). Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists? New America. https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/policy-papers/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Chomsky, N. (2015). Because We Say So. Penguin Books.
Gelber, K. (2016). Free Speech After 9-11. Oxford University Press.
Kundnani, A. (2015). The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. Verso.
Macrina, A. (2015). The Tor Browser and Intellectual Freedom in the Digital Age. Reference and user services quarterly, 54(4), 17-20.
McLaughlin, J. (2015, November 17). U.S. MASS SURVEILLANCE HAS NO RECORD OF THWARTING LARGE TERROR ATTACKS, REGARDLESS OF SNOWDEN LEAKS. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2015/11/17/u-s-mass-surveillance-has-no-record-of-thwarting-large-terror-attacks-regardless-of-snowden-leaks/.
Molitorisz, S. (2020). Net Privacy: How We Can Be Free in an Age of Surveillance. NewSouth Publishing.
Norenzayan, A. (2013). Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict. Princeton University Press.
O’Shea, L. (2019). Future Histories: What Ada Lovelace, Tom Paine, and the Paris Commune Can Teach Us About Digital Technology. Verso.
Porter, C. C. (2008). De-identified Data and Third Party Data Mining: The Risk of Reidentification of Personal Information. Washington Journal of Law, Technology and Arts, 5(1).
Pridmore, J., Vitak, J., Trottier, D., Liao, Y., Zimmer, M., Mols, A., & Kumar, P. C. (2019). Intelligent Personal Assistants and the Intercultural Negotiations of Dataveillance in Platformed Households. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 125-131.
Scully, J. (2020). Glimpses of Utopia: Real Ideas for A Fairer World. Pantera Press.
Tapscott, D., & Tapscott, A. (2016). Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies Is Changing the World. Penguin.
Torchinsky, R. (2022, June 24). How period tracking apps and data privacy fit into a post-Roe v. Wade climate. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/05/10/1097482967/roe-v-wade-supreme-court-abortion-period-apps.
Tuohy, J. P. (2022, August 6). Amazon bought iRobot to see inside your home. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/23293687/amazon-irobot-acquisition-purchase-smarthome-intelligence-privacy-analysis.
WikiLeaks. (2017, March 7). Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed [Press Release]. https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. Princeton University Press.
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